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Michael Wilding, Socio.l Visions, Sydney: Sydney Association for Studies In Society and
Cu Iture, 1993.
Social Visions is a collection of critical essays on works of prose fiction from the
eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The works examined are Swift's
Gulliver's Travels, Meredith's Beauchamp's Career, Conrad's Heart of Darkness,
Conrad's Nostromo, Alan Sillitoe's 'political novels', principally Saturday Night and
Sunday Morning, Key to the Door, and the trilogy, The Death ofWilliam Posters, Milan
Kundera's The Joke, and Isaac Singer's stories collected inThe Image.
Wilding's book is published in the series, 'Sydney Studies in Society and Culture',
a series which now comprises ten titles, and which, ifone is to judge from this volwne,
appears to need a general editor. The essays in Social Visions were all originally
published elsewhere. The books and journals which provided the original places of
publication are mentioned in the preface, but are not all listed in the bibliography.
Moreover, the separate essays are not referenced to their original places of publication,
so one has to guess how old each essay is. I happen to know that the essay on Swift was
published in Studies in the Eighteenth Century, vol. 11 (ed. R. F. Brissenden) in 1973;
one can deduce that the essay on Kundera must have been published after the English
translation of The Joke in 1982 (this translation is not listed in the bibliography), and
the essay on Singer after the publication ofThe Image in 1986; but when the other pieces
were published remains to me a mystery. I feel this is a pity, because Social Visions
contains some of the most impressive and challenging criticism that I have read for a
long time, and I would like to be able to consider how Wilding's opinions and critical
methods have changed or evolved over a period of what must be presumably about
twenty years during which these essays were written. Even without dates of original
publication I think I can detect some trends, but I should prefer to have some defmite
reference points.
In the preface Wilding says that Social Visions is concerned with novels that
specifically deal with issues of society and politics, and that he is attempting to restore
the political dimensions to the reading of 'classic' and contemporary authors. He thinks
that academic literary criticism has tended to absorb literary works into the 'dominant
ideology' of society, and against this tendency he opposes the idea of a 'radical'
criticism which is to emphasise 'the problematic socio-political features' of the
classics, and to restore works excluded from the canon 'to attention'. While I
sympathise with this programme of repoliticising literary criticism, which has tended
to be aligned with moral judgment rather than socio-political, it seems to me that
Wilding's statement of it belongs to the conjuncture of the 1970s, and thaI, while
Wilding's project remains valid and necessary, it does not take account of the
transformation of that conjuncture in the 1980s. Wilding writes as though the ideologi-
cal domain were still divided between conservative capitalist ideology on the one side,
and radical Marxist ideology on the other. This may have been true of the 'hot years'
between 1968 and 1976, but since the endofthe 'seventies we have secn the installation
within the academy, and within society generally, of an ideology that offers to transcend
the capitalist-socialist division. Within the academy at least, this new ideology has
become dominant. Wilding faces the problem of the rise of the 'social movements'-
feminism, gay lib., post-colonial critique, and so on-but he does not address it. To a
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Marxist the social movements present a contradictory character: on the one hand, a
legitimate drive to abolish social inequalities suffered by particular non-class-based
groups, and on the other, because of their very nature, a powerful revival of the
bourgeois ideology ofequality-a revival that has effectively displaced Marxism from
the centre of 'radical' politics. How are socialist intellectuals to relate to these
movements? by negotiation, critical support, opposition, or what? Wilding must be as
aware as anybody of the problem, but it is not mentioned in his preface. This is
disappointing, especially since in some of the essays that follow he does engage with
issues of sexual politics, and gives ample evidence of the possibility of connecting
socialist and feminist critiques (and implicitly other social critiques as well).
To an apolitical reader all this may seem remote from literary criticism. But it is not.
Wilding does not substitute political criticism for literary criticism. He writes literary
criticism that is politically informed (and morally informed as well). At its best
Wilding's criticism convincingly demonstrates the connexion between a judgment on
a literary work in terms specific to literary art, and political understanding relevant to
the content of the work.
That Wilding responds to literary works as a literary critic and not merely as an
ideologue can be seen from the manifest virtues of his commentary. He will focus
sharply on the immediate impression that a work must make upon a sensitive reader,
evoking that impression in a precise and complex description, and then move to the
necessary qualifications that must be made from a more reflective, more analytical
reading. Of Singer's stories he writes: 'The same personality runs through all of them.
... It is tempting to write "genial" of the personality but that would be to disregard the
sometimes rebarbative note that reveals itself. For beneath the unpretentious, effortless
seeming surface ofthese stories is a firm, calculated attitudeofmind'. And then Wilding
begins to explore the nature of this calculated attitude, moving with assurance between
the stories and relevant external data.
Wilding also exhibits that mark of the good critic, the ability to quote well. He will
seize upon a theme essential to a writer's project, slate it in summary form, and then
proceed to unfold all its implications over half a dozen pages, using in the process a
series of substantial quotations that both illustrate the idea of the theme, and demon-
strate its inherence in the text in question.
But literary critical technique is not just a formal matter. In the essay on Jlearl of
Darkness Wilding uses minute linguistic analysis to reveal the ironic ideological
implications in Conrad's descriptions of both the African river and the Thames. In the
essay on Gulliver's Travels he shows how Swift uses his fictions, symbols and
dialogues to depoliticise politics, and to naturalize his own conservative ideology. And
by comparing episode with episode Wilding brings out the contradictory nature of
Swift'sToryism, that mixtureofconservatism and mystification in relation to domestic
politics, and a genuinely radical attack on foreign imperialism. In the essay on
Beauchamp's Career he traces out the contours of Meredith's 'anatomy of the
establishment', and shows how the incidents and changing pattern of relationships
between the characters construct a vision of the solidarity of the English ruling class
around 1870 in a particular socio-political crisis. In the essay on Noslromo Wilding
mischievously, amusingly and, in my view, convincingly turns F. R. Lcavis's criteria
of 'realisation' and 'placement' again~tLeavis's own approving judgment on Conrad's
novel. Wilding integrates Lcavis's criteria with a Lukacsian concern for 'realism'. He
convicts Conrad of offering to write about a subject which he did not understand,
namely, capitalist imperialism in Latin America, and of producing a work which
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conceals the real social forces determining the lives of the characters, which mystifies
a capitalist social fonnation behind the phenomena of pre~apitalist societies, and
which, instead of realising the nature of the the society in the activities, sufferings and
relations of the characters, relies on token gestures and vague symbolism. In this way
Wilding shows how criteria of artistic construction need to be combined not only with
psychological and moral understanding, but also with political and economic under-
standing. In the essay on The Joke Wilding criticises Kundera for indulging in an
unplaced sexism of the most odious kind, and notes that Western liberal critics have
been willing to tolerate this for the sake of Kundera's anti~ommunistpolitics.
In general the excellence of Wilding's criticism seems to me to derive from three
conditions. First, it is crilicism and not just interpretation. Wilding is coneerned with
whether a novel is a good novel or not, and his criticism shows both the necessity of
asking this question, and the ways by which it may be answered. Second, Wilding's
ultimate criteria for judgment arc truth and human well-being, and he shows how these
abstractions can become relevant specific concerns in relation to novels whose stories
belong to concrete historical situations. Third, Wilding writes criticism as a practitioner
of fiction. The author of twelve fictional works himself, he has a sympathetic concern
with the practical problems of writing fiction. And this concern gives him an inwardness
that can produce brilliant articulations of insights that other critics may only have
sensed vaguely, for example, Wilding's discussion of the distinction between the
realistic novel and the moral fable on the ground that the realistic novel is (or ought to
be) self-validating by the convincing truthfulness of iL~ realisation of characters and
events, while the moral fable that uses iL~ characters and events as counters to illustrate
a thesis remains to be validated by external evidence (see pp. 78-79 of Social Visions,
and compare Lcavis's unsatisfactory remarks on the moral fable in The GrealTradilion,
ch. 5). His insight into Singer's fiction is clearly powered by a shared concern with the
question, how is it possible to write realist fiction after modernism?
It is both courageous and dangerous to repUblish together essays that were
originally published separately, since inconsistencies will emerge, and the very virtues
of some essays will light up the defects of others. I have to record some reservations.
Wilding's essays on the bourgeois writers, Swift, Conrad, Kundera and Singer, are
much slIonger than those on the 'radical' writers, Meredith and Sillitoe. Wilding
displays more justice in attack on his political opponents than in defence of his political
allies. The explanation for this seems to be connected with the vagueness with which
Wilding uses the term, 'radical': this ha~ to cover a range of very different political
positions, and sometimes this vagueness can lead Wilding into what I take to be
misreadings. For example, Wilding sees Meredith as a radical writer in Beauchamp's
Career. This seems to me to be only half lIue. The negative attack on the Victorian
landed class and its professional ideologues is radical enough, but this seems to be
balanced by Meredith's giving all the political realism to the Tories, and subverting
Beauchamp's political enthusiasm as a Quixotic idealism unfitted for this world.
Wilding suggests that Meredith's attitude to Beauchamp is one of radical criticism, but
I find no evidence for this in the text of the novel. On the contrary, Meredith seems to
use Beauchamp's quixotry in order to displace the interest of the novel from political
reality to moral idealism. Moreover, the radical political programme for which
Meredith seems to have some sympathy (although he seems to regard the idea of its
early implementation as impossible) turns out to be that of 'social democracy', that is,
the preservation of capitalism, the preservation of the class structure, the democratisa-
tion of the suffrage, and measures of economic regulation and social welfare. This
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programme, radical in the 1870s, was the 'dominant ideology' of the 1950s and '60s,
and Wilding himself denOlUlces it in his essay on Sillitoe.It seems to me that Wilding
is so intent on constructing a radical tradition of fiction that he does not pay enough
attention to the specific political content of the different radical positions as he moves
through history.
I cannot help describing the essay on Sillitoe as 'special pleading'. At the beginning
Wilding tries to defend Sillitoe from the hostile criticism ofboth establishment and left-
wing critics, who have condemned Sillitoe's fiction for expressing a futile and stupid
rebelliousness and nothing else, and for a corresponding formlessness of construction.
Momentarily, Wilding abandons the Lcavisite and Lukacsian criteria that he deploys
so powerfully against Conrad and Kundera, and suggests that Arthur Seaton's unplaccd
spontaneous rebelliousness in Salurday Nighl and Surulay Morning is politically
valuable, and that formlessness is appropriate to proletarian fiction. But in the rest of
the essay where Wilding discusses Sillitoc's other novels he takes it all back again, and
makes the same sort ofcriticisms as he previously rebutted. Moreover, Wilding defends
Sillitoe from the same charge ofsexism on which he convicts Kundera. I find Wilding's
defence of Sillitoe on this point wholly unconvincing.
There is one place where Wilding seems to me to be led astray by his preoccupation
with politics. He rejects Lcavis's criticism of the ending of lIearl ofDarkness for not
realising the evil toward which Conrad is gesturing, and substitutes the criticism that
Conrad fails to proceed to an analysis of imperialist exploitation for which he has been
preparing with Marlowe's voyage upriver. This seems to me to miss the point. Kurtz's
evil is designed to place the whole political-commercial world that Marlowe has
described, and to place it by invoking a dimension of human experience that the
political-commercial world has forgotten, or is too stupid to recognize. Wilding sees
Conrad's shift of interest as a displacement from the novel's real subject, but it is not.
It struck me as I read this essay that Wilding wrongly sees a displacement in Hearl of
Darkness, and misses the one that is actually present in Beauchamp's Career.
Over the whole book one gets no definite sense of what Wilding's own politics are.
His orientation is clearly socialist, but whether it is Marxist, social democratic, or
'socialist anarchist' (as with Sillitoe's characters) is difficult to say. I cannot help
feeling that this vagueness is connected with the misreadings. Wilding's insights seem
to be sharpest where his commitment is clearest and strongest.
Two more points: Singer's interest in the occult is presented by Wilding without
criticism as part of Singer's realism. This seems very odd coming from a critic who
generally appears to be a materialist. Moreover, Singer's sexism is only mildly
criticised where Kundera's is strongly attacked. This difference seems to arise from
Wilding's rmding Singer an ally for literary realism in post-modernist times. That
Wilding should seek such an ally in a writer who is firmly anti-communist is perhaps
an index of how hostile the world ha~ become for socialist intellectuals since the early




Henry Ansgar Kelly, Ideas and Forms of Tragedy from Aristotle to the Middle Ages,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
If there are people who still think that 'tragedy' is a univocallCrm with a more or less
constant meaning across the centuries, this book will bring an end to their innocence.
There may of course be descriptions of tragedy that include virtually everything that
writers throughout history have called by that name-a good example is Aristotle's
description ofllagedy as 'an imitation ofserious action'-but these descriptions are too
general to be very enlightening. Anyway, I think that most of those who are likely to
read Kelly's monograph will already have abandoned the view that there is a single
comprehensive and informative definition of the term. For Kelly presupposes a highly
educated audience, one that has enough knowledge of Latin and medieval history, and
enough interest in llagedy to be patient with a meticulous survey of both the familiar
and the obscure. And such an audience must have recognised that 'llagedy' is
equivocal. Nevertheless, Kelly's readers may be surprised to discover how radically
equivocal he thinks the term is.
Kelly examines the views of medieval scholars, commentators, and lexicographers
who inform us about tragedy (these views he calls ideas of tragedy) as well as the
handful of medieval works that claim to be instances of tragedy (thejormr of tragedy).
His goal is to show that historical ideas and forms of tragedy are too various to admit
of any harmony, and he pursues that goal relentlessly across a thousand years and over
two hundred different authorities. Indeed, Kelly's erudition reminds me of a comment
that Cervantes makes about Don Quixote's sage, Cide Harnete Benengeli, that he was
'a very exact historian and precise in all his details.' Readers can expect from this book
no less and no more than they would from an exact historian. It is an impressively
researched and detailed catalogue of opinions about tragedy, from which, however, we
are entitled to draw ourown conclusions. There is liule doubt as to the conclusion Kelly
thinks must be drawn-for an epigraph he chooses a remark from Nietzsche's The
Wanderer and his Shadow: 'All words are pockets into which now this, now that is put,
and sometimes many things at once.' Nevertheless, if it were possible to draw a
different conclusion (as I would like to do), that would do nothing to undermine the
usefulness of this book as a source.
To write an exact or scientific history of llagedy, as Kelly does, is obviously only
one way to approach the subjcct. One could, alternatively, look at the past with
discrimination, from a point of view that presupposes understanding of what llagedy
essentially is. In that case the story of tragedy in the Middle Ages becomes a llagedy
itself: misfortune, confusion and decay conspire to obliterate knowledge of a great and
noble form of art. Kelly steadfastly resists this more poetic approach to his subjcct. He
seems to expect that we should begin without preconceptions and then auemptto derive
an understanding of tragedy from the total range of views about it. Moreover, Kelly
mostly resists making judgements about the superiority of anyone medieval view of
tragedy to another. He is meticulous in uncovering sources, and he will often surmise
that one author's view approx imates to the classical understanding of tragedy far more
nearly than any of his contemporaries (e.g. John of Salisbury), but his tone is
consistently descriptive rather than evaluative.
Is tragedy, or art in general, best understood according to a scientific history, as the
sum of a series of descriptions? Or must the understanding of art by means of art, or
perhaps philosophy, be intellectually prior to its history? Aristotle himself says, 'Poetry
is more philosophical and more weighty (spoudaioteron) than history, for poetry
primarily concerns the universal, whereas history concerns the particular' (Poetics 1.9,
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1451 b5-7). II may be a paradox of history that the more authentically it represents the
past. the more seamless, and consequently the less intelligible, it becomes. A history
that concerned itself exclusively with particulars would be incoherent. Kelly, for his
part. clearly recognises this, and so in his conclusion he attempts to organise, as well
as can be done, the diverse parts of his historyoftragcdy. Heeven ends on a poetic rather
than a historical note: '0 Fortune, where is thy sting! Sad to say, tragedy, the chronicle
of ever occurring disasters, remains with us. But the best-expressed tragedies have
given us much solace and comfort' (p. 222). One has the impression that this conclusion
sits uneasily with the plan of the book (so much must be excluded and obscured!). Yet
I am more in sympathy with Kelly's Aristotelian conclusion than his Nietzschean
history. If 'tragedy' is a pocket into which many ideas have becn put, still we want not
only to know how so many ideas came to rest there (what Kelly admirably demon-
stratc.~), but to be able to say that some things belong there and others ought never to
have been put there at all (e.g. Isidore's idea that 'theatre' is another word for 'brothel'
or Bernard of Utrecht's wildly ignorant syllogism: The prize for a winning tragedy was
a goat. goats are vile animals, therefore the essence of tragedy lies in its portrayal ofvile
decds). The approach to tragedy by way of history is incomplete, even a~ an account
of tragedy in the Middle Ages; in that lies my chief and practically my only criticism
of this book.
I say all this prior to giving a summary of the book 'scontents precisely because any
such summary must distort the txxlk's intent and accomplishments. I shall therefore
restrict myself here to a general overview and a few comments on particular episodes
in the history of tragedy. The scope of Kelly's investigation is the interval between
Aristotle and Chaucer, with discussion concentrated on four periods: Late Classical,
Early Medieval, the twelfth-century, and the high Middle Ages. The history of tragedy
in each of these periods is marked at the beginning by a significant development or
conception that exerts a continuing influence on successive generations ofcommenta-
tors. For example. Roman alterations to classical performance of tragedies-which
turned fully dramatised plays into pantomimes. dances and solor<.'adings (orsingings)--
probably ought to be seen as a development rather than a mere corruption or attenuation.
But later writers. who no longer had knowledge of classical performances (indeed no
first-hand knowledge of any performances of tragedies), derived an extremely impov-
erished idea of tragedy from the brief descriptions contained in Roman sources sueh as
the An Poelica of Horace and Boethius' COfLwlalions ofPhilosophy.
Apart from Horace and Boethius, there are few writers whose discussions of
tragedy were widely influential. directly or indirectly, throughout the Middle Ages; the
most important of these is Isidore of Seville. Isidore includes in his Etymologies brief
descriptions ofvarious aspects oftragedy, from poetic composition to theatre construc-
tion to the attire of tragic actors, but his core idea is the view that tragic poems depict
the 'evil and sorrowful deeds of evil kings' (Etymologies 18, Kelly's translation). II is
from Isidore 's unfavourable descriptions and lillie else that writers from the seventh to
the twelfth century derived their ideas of tragedy. This is a very bleak period for
tragedy, so bleak that it is not clear whether to prefer the fragmented and imaginative
views of the tenth and eleventh centuries. or the roughly two hundred and fifty year
silence from Isidore to Remigius.
In the twelfth century. thanks largely to the influence of William of Conches, we
find a renewed emphasis on the Boethean view that tragedies depict the unexpected fall
of a great person or kingdom. In many writers this view is accompanied by Isidorian
prejudices-the fall is deserved. the kings corrupt-but on the whole we have little
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reason to suppose that there is a common idea of tragedy in this period. Here we find
some of the most imposing evidence for Kelly's cquivocity thesis. As he puts it, 'The
different meanings and nuances of the word "tragedy," whether explicit or implied,that
we have seen in this section are interesting in showing the varied changes that can be
rung on a term because of the diverse reading backgrounds of individual authors and
their respective limited exposures to traditional usages' (p. 78). If we had only the
resources of the seventh to the twelfth century it would almost seem possible to comply
with Ernest Renan's ludicrous thought experiment: S'imaginat qui fa tragedie f1'est
autre chose que l'art de louer ... (Averroes).
The high medieval period brings us a bit more into the light, even though the Latin
West mostly fails to take advantage of important rediscoveries, most notably of
Aristotle's Poetics and the tragedies of Seneca. Seneca's plays, however, werc
innuential among the Paduan prehumanists, particularly Albertino Mussato, who was
infused with enough enthusiasm to compose a tragedy of his own, Eceriflis (named after
Ezzclino da Romano, tyrant of Padua). This is a fascinating cpisodc in Kelly's history.
On the one hand hc shows how much difference the possession of actual tragedies made
to a small but intellectually vibrant group of scholars (Mussato's composition of the
Ecerinis. for example, brieny issued in a sort of literary and dramatic revival at Padua).
on the other hand he shows how insulated the rest of Europe was from this revival. and
how much it remained under the innuence of scholastic inertia. For example. even
Dante seems not to have been aware of the rediscovery of Seneca. though he was well
acquainted with some of the Paduan scholars.
Kelly closes the book with some observations about developments and renewed
interest in tragedy in England, France, Italy. and Spain during the fourteenth and early
fifteenth centuries. His survey here is somewhat more cursory than in previous
chapters. and awaits a separate study. Rut he does look closely enough to conclude that.
'in spite of the currency of ideas of tragedy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
even where Seneca's tragedies were known. there was little impulse to contribute
original compositions to a genre of tragedy ... and little generic idea of "the tragic," in
the sense of exemplifying a typical emotion or reaction of tragedy (however under-
stood)' (p. 221).
This much ought to suffice to give an idea of the contents, though as I said, Kelly's
book hardly wants or tolerates a summary. I will close with two brief comments. The
first concerns ideas of tragedy in the classical period. Kelly could have perhaps said
more about this period (there is aonly a summary of Aristotle's Poetics, pp. 1-5). since
already by the time of Aristotle the genre exhibited a tremendous variety. It is for that
very reason that Aristotle uses such a generic description as 'an imitation of serious
action.' He recognises that tragedies may have endings that are happy or sad, that tragic
calamities may strike the noble or basc; he even seems to recognise that poetry is not
esscntial to tragedy (though his official definition precludes it) because hc says that
though Empedocles wrote hexameters hc is a physicist all thc same, and that Herodotus
would be a historian even in verse. Obviously the converse could be applied: Plato is
a poet in prose. In fact, a~ any reader of the Symposium knows. Plato himself was well
aware of this, just as he knew that tragedy and comedy are not intrinsically opposed.
The essence of tragedy (and comedy) lies not in the verseor the plot. but rather in nature
and human nature. And this brings me to my second comment, which concerns the
difficulty that medieval scholars had in comprehcnding tragedy. It is astonishing and
edifying to see how much the understanding is corrupted by focussing onc's attention
on the accidents of a genrc. Never has there been so much speculation about tragedy
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in tenns ofbuskins. goats. and shady lillIe houses on the stage as there was in the Middle
Ages. But wecan be sympathetic: imagine that two hundred years from now the motion
picrure industry is defunct, completely forgotten except for a few scattered references
to 'studios' and 'Oscars.'
I found Kelly's book illuminating and engrossing, exemplary in its scholarship, and
most of all a work that one could wrestle with. think about and admire.
Eugenio Benitez
Umbcrto Eco,/nlerpre/Qlion and overinlerpnlalion, with Richard Rorty, Jonathan Culler
and Christine Brooke·Rose, editl'd by Ster..n Colllnl, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992. Paperback, 151pp. RRI' S29.95.
This volume includes the revised texts of Umberto Eco's 1990 Tanner Lecrures, along
with papers by Richard Rorty, Jonathan Culler and Christine Brooke·Rose. The laller
were speakers at a seminar held after Eco's Cambridge lectures, and the volume
concludes with a response by Eco. Despite his efforts in this response to portray the
collection as a debate, and similar efforts on the part of the editor, Stefan Collini, the
overall effect is rather that of a dialogue des sourds. Each of the contributors pursues
a private line of argument which only occasionally interrupts the discourse of another
speaker. and much of what is said addresses an imaginary and absent interlocutor.
Eco's primary target is a fonn of overinterpretation which he associates with
deconstruction, and which he takes to involve the assumption that a text can be made
to mean anything which the reader wants it to mean. Against this. he defends the weak
and unexceptionable principle that there arc limits to the interpretativc possibilities of
any given text: 'What I want to say is that therc are somewhere eriteria for limiting
interpretation' (40). By contrast, Rorty does not assert that anything is possible in the
interpretation game, but he docs reject the idea that texts themselves sctlimits to their
possible uses. Rorty's primary target is not Eco's thesis, but rather something which
he supposes to be a premise of Eco's argument, namely the distinction between using
and interpreting texl~, or between 'internal' and 'cxternal' conditions of texrual
interpretation, and more generally the distinction betwcen signifying bits of the world
such as signs and texts, and other objecl~ such as trees and quarks. Since it was written
for the same occasion, his paper is a response not to Eco's lectures, but to his carlier
published paper, '/ntenlio lectoris: the state of the art' (Differenlia. 2, 1988, 147.68).
Nevertheless, it does contain an implicit challenge to a notion which Eco invokes in thc
course of his lectures. Between the intention of the author and thc intention of the
reader, Eco argues, there is a third important clement: the inlenlio operis, the intention
of the work. In his reply, Eco docs not return to the notion of inlenliooperis, but instead
appeals to the Piercean idea of the consensus ofa given interpretative community as the
only ultimate check on extravagant interpretations.
Rorty has no sympathy for the radical deconstructionist cither, whom he accuses of
remaining attached to a form of textual cssentialism. Culler points out the disturbing
disparity between Eco's deconstructionist. who represenl~ an extreme case of reader-
oriented l-iiticism, and Rorty's deconstructionist, who represents a nco-structuralist
belief in underlying textual structures or mechanisms which operatc independently of
readers and writers. Hisown paper ddends a fonn ofover interpretation which is no less
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mild than Eco's limits to interpretation, namely one which champions the value of
"pursuing questions that the text does not pose to its model reader" (114): for example,
asking why there are three little pigs in the well known children's story and not simply
what happens to them. Brooke-Rose's contribution says nothing about Eco's lectures,
or the issues raised by the other discussants, but concerns the modem form ofpalimpsest
novel of which Eco's Foucauu's Pendulum is one example.
Despite or perhaps because of the failure to conform to elementary communicative
norms, there is much of interest in this assemblage of texts. Eco's flfstlecture contains
an erudite archaeology of the overly suspicious practices of postmodem interpretation.
He finds the roots of this phenomenon in the hermetic tradition, according to which "a
text is an open-ended universe where the interpreter can discover infinite connections"
(39). Against the underlying principle ofhermetie semiosis. which allows that any form
ofsimilarily between things is sufficient to make one the sign of the other, Eco advances
some forensic conditions which must be salisfied before something can be considered
a sign ofsomething else: that the evidence cannot be explained more economically, that
it points to a limited and not an indefinile class of possible causes, and that it fits with
other evidence (49). Such criteria will not enable us to distinguish between the many
hypotheses of signification which might salisfy them, but this is as far as Eco's
argument goes. His strategy is fundamentally Popperian: there are no rules which will
allow us to asccrtain the best intcrpretation ofa given text, but there are rules which will
allow us to ascertain which interpretalions are bad (52). From this it follows that 'it is
not true that everything goes' (144).
Eeo presents erudile and amusing examples of interpretations which exceed the
bounds of plausibility set by these rules. such as the late 19th century attempt to find
Masonic and Rosicrucian symbolism in the work of Dante. Over and above such
examples. his argument rests upon the claim that there is an intention of the text which
any acceptable interpretation must address. Like Arthur Danto's conception of a work
of art, Eco's conceplion of a text is that of a 'machine conceived in order to elicit
interpretations' (85). While the class of possible good interpretations is open, and any
interpretation amounts to a hypothesis about the inJenJio operis, the only way to test
such hypotheses is '10 check it upon the text as a coherent whole' (65). In this sense,
Eco argues, 'internallexlual coherence controls the otherwise uncontrollable drives of
the reader'.(65).
Rorty does not disagree thai if we wanl an interpretation to be convincing, it should
say somelhing aboullhe whole ralher than merely a part of its objcct. But he can find
no use for the metaphor of a text's intcrnal coherence. Rather, he thinks that a text "just
has whalever coherence il happened 10 acquire during the last roll of the hermeneutic
wheel"(97). To suggesl that texts lhemselves impose certain readings is like saying that
a screwdriver coerces us into using it to drive screws, when we can perfectly find other
uses for it, such as prying open packages. In other words, Rorty detects a residue of
logocentrism in Eco's view that the text has inlenlions of its own, while his own view
is thai a text is simply a set of slimuliwhich make it more less difficult to convince
yourself or others of what you wanled to say about it (103). In fact, the difference
between Eco and Rorty at this point does not appear to be very great. Take Rorty's
'better example' of the software program: he points out that hecan very well use a word-
processing package for a purpose for which it was neither designed nor gives optimal
performance, such as preparing lax returns. What he docs not say, but the example
implies, is lhal there are limits 10 the class of possible uses of a given program: let him
try to use Word to perform complex algebraic operations. Such limits to possible uses
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are all that Eco requires in order to establish his minimal point that there is an internal
coherence to the text. But if this is all that is meant, one may doubt that 'intention' of
the text is an appropriate description.
If Eco's talk of textual 'intentions' is questionable metaphorics, RoTty's extreme
externalism leads him into strange territory and unlikely company. When he claims that
reading texts is a mallerof placing them in relation with 'other texts, people. obsessions.
bits of information or what have you '( I05), Rorty sounds very like the French anarcho-
pragmatists Deleui'-c and Guattari, who also proclaim that there is no philosophically
significant difference between what a text speaks of and what it is made of: "We will
never ask what a book means, a~ signified or signifier, we will not look for anything to
understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other
things it does or does not transmit intensities ... A book itself is a lillIe machine" (A
Thousand Plaleaus, Minnesota, 1980. p.4). Rorty travels further along this particular
line of night by unfavourably contrasting 'methodical' readings, which apply a
preconceived grid of interpretation, with 'inspired' ones which are more like an
affcctive encounter endowed with the power to change the reader's purposes and
priorities, 'to make a difference to theeritics' conception ofwho she is, what she is good
for, what she wants to do with herself(1 07). Even for the anarcho-pragmatist eritic, it
seems that the text is substantial enough to challenge the intentions of a reader in
unexpected ways. However, there is no a priori rule telling us how such confrontation
ought to be resolved: the wheel of interpretation can tum in either direction.
Pau/Pallon
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